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INTRODUCTION

Law and morality-my, what an old friend the topic for this
Conference seems to me. Showing that law was infused with
morality was my first topic in jurisprudence. Indeed, it is what drew
me into jurisprudence at all. I was interested in philosophy and law
long before I became interested in jurisprudence, that is, the
philosophy of law. It was seeing law as a branch of ethics-as
related intimately to morality-that made jurisprudence interesting
enough for me to pursue it.
This was not just because I, like others in my generation of legal
philosophers, grew up in the shadow of the Hart-Fuller debate (in
which the relationship of law to morality was central).' It was
rather because showing how law was part of morality made the
abstract study of law, that is, legal philosophy-seem a more noble
calling, not a mere techne, a trade, a matter for the sharp pencils
crowd and legal jujitsu. Seeing law as obligating, at least of judges
if not citizens, made law-and the question of law's nature-matter
in a way that positivistic social sciences of law never did.2
I have organized my remarks around the four aspects of the topic
of law and morality that have dominated my own jurisprudential
scholarship and teaching these past four decades. The first is the
relationship between the law that obligates judges, and morality:
exactly how, in what ways, does that law relate to morality? The
second involves the proper aims and limits of lawmaking in a
democratic society: put simply, is it proper to legislate morality? The
third is the nature of that morality to which the law that we either
1. The first salvo in this debate should probably be given to Fuller in his exchange with
Ernst Nagel. See Lon L. Fuller, Human Purposeand Natural Law, 53 J. PHIL. 697 (1956).
H.L.A. Hart responded to Fuller's arguments in his justly celebrated article, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958). Fuller's response was
Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1958)
[hereinafter Fuller, Fidelity]. Hart restated his views in THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), and
Fuller, his in THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). Hart's response to the latter was Book Review,
78 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1965). Fuller's rejoinder is in his THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. 1969).
2. I chart the differences between Hart's positivistic and externalist, social science of law,
and an internal jurisprudence guided by the stipulation that law necessarily obligates judges
in their role as judges, in Michael S. Moore, Hart'sConcluding Scientific Postscript,4 LEGAL
THEORY 301 (1998).
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have, or ought to have, is related: is the justice part of "justice under
law" real or conventional morality? The fourth is the content of that
morality apt to be part of the law we have or ought to have: should
law be concerned with virtue, or should it focus on rights and
obligations only? If the latter, is it deontological or consequentialist
morality that is of most relevance to law? If consequentialist, is it
utilitarian or a more pluralistic consequentialism? If it is deontological, is it libertarian (natural right) or egalitarian (distributive
justice) in nature? These are not just questions of the general shape
of ethics and meta-ethics (although they are also that). They are
also questions about that part of morality apt for law-justice, say,
rather than personal virtue.
This is a laughably large set of topics. But one of the benefits of
giving introductory remarks is that one can introduce a topic by
painting only in bold strokes, and with a broad brush. And then, as
one of our broad-brush-strokes-kind of presidents used to say, one
3
can leave the troublesome details to the "fellas."

I. HOW DOES MORALITY RELATE TO THE LAW WE HAVE?
So the first topic: how is law related to morality? With apologies
to Herbert Hart-who accused us American jurisprudes of being
"obsessed" with judicial behavior 4 -I still think that this question
of how law is related to morality is best approached through judicial
obligation. Provisionally at least, fix law as that which obligates
judges in their role as judges, and then ask: how ought judges use
morality in their decision of disputed law cases? So proceeding
temporarily suspends the question of whether such morality-the
morality judges are obligated to use in their role as judges-is or is
not part of the law. By stipulative definition, assume for now that
it is, and then ask the more practically interesting question: how
should morality properly enter into judicial decisions?

3. See, e.g., RICHARD REEVES, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE TRIUMPH OF IMAGINATION 15
(2005).
4. See H.L.A. Hart, American JurisprudenceThrough English Eyes: The Nightmareand
the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969, 969-70 (1977).
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A. Morality in JudicialReasoning
I have killed as many trees as anyone on this topic, with over-long
and rather elaborate argumentation.5 Yet at the end of the day it
seems to me that there are only four, not very complicated ways that
morality properly enters judicial reasoning. The first two stem from
what I will call "the obvious law"-the stuff (like statutes) that
everyone's theory of law would classify as law.6
1. The Explicit Incorporationof Morality by Obvious Law
First is the explicit incorporation of morality by such obvious
law.7 When statutes award custody of minor children to that parent
most likely to further the best interestof the child, award citizenship
only to those applicants possessed of good moral character, and
deport those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude,they explicitly
require judges to make moral decisions in the course of their making
legal decisions. Likewise, when constitutions such as that of the
United States require judges to review statutes to see whether they
give the process that is due persons, protection of the laws that is
equal, and respect each citizen's rights to free speech, free exercise
of religion, freedom from unreasonablesearches and seizures, etc.,
they require judges to reach legal conclusions based on moral
premises. Similarly, when the common law makes tort liability turn
on whether one behaved reasonably,or when statutory law justifies
what would otherwise be criminal conduct by a balance of evils

5. See Michael S. Moore, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107
(1989) [hereinafter Moore, Unwritten Constitution];Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural
Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2001) [hereinafter
Moore, Justifying the NaturalLaw Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Law as Justice, 18 SOC. PHIL.
& POL'Y 115 (2001); Michael S. Moore, Legal PrinciplesRevisited, 82 IOWA L. REV. 867 (1997);
Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985)
[hereinafter Moore, NaturalLaw Theory]; Michael S. Moore, Precedent,Induction,and Ethical
Generalization,in PRECEDENT IN LAW 188 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Michael S. Moore,
The Semantics of Judging,54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151 (1981) [hereinafter Moore, Semantics].
6. Well, almost everyone. John Chipman Gray called such things the "sources of law,"
to be distinguished from the law itself (which consisted of judicial applications in particular
cases). See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY,THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 145-227 (1909).
7. See Moore, Unwritten Constitution,supra note 5, at 132-37; Moore, Semantics, supra
note 5, at 242-46; Moore, Natural Law Theory, supra note 5, at 332-38.

1528

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1523

defense, judges must make moral decisions in order to make legal
decisions.
Such explicit incorporation of morality by the obvious law poses
problems for some kinds of positivistic theories of law,8 but taking
sides in such domestic debates is not here my concern. Irrespective
of whether or not a legal theory can accommodate the fact and
remain positivistic, it is unquestionably true that judges in legal
systems with obvious law like ours have to make some kind of moral
decisions in order to apply such laws to the cases before them.
2. Morally Justifying the Authority of Obvious Law
Second, there is what I shall call the regressive considerations of
the thoughtful judge.9 Judges make people do things they do not
want to do. With all the force of the state behind them, they coerce
people into giving up their money, their liberty, their children, and
their lives. Such coercion requires justification. The immediate
justification for each occasion of judicial coercion is of course the
(obvious) law itself: a judge might justify his judgment in a particular criminal case, for example, by a penal statute which directs him
to so decide. But the thoughtful judge regresses the question of
justification: what justifies the judge in regarding that criminal
statute as imposing this obligation upon her? The answer is
presumably in terms of some doctrines of legislative supremacy and
the ban on common law crimes. But what makes those doctrines a
source of judicial obligation? Presumably, some political ideals such
as democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law. By this
time the thoughtful judge is deep into the morality of such ideals
even in applying the most obvious law to the most obvious cases.
8. The question currently debated is whether positivism can accommodate much
explicitly moral content to the law, "soft" positivists urging that it can and "hard" positivists
urging the contrary.
9. Hart and Kelsen were of course quite alive to the worries I am calling "the regressive
considerations of the thoughtful judge." They famously sought to end such regress of
justification with their ultimate tests of legal validity, the "rule of recognition" and the
"grundnorm." Lon Fuller accurately pinpointed this as a weak point of positivism, urging that
surely these constitutional norms themselves called for a moral justification in order to be
authoritative for judges. Fuller, Fidelity,supra note 1, at 639. Dworkin then expanded Fuller's
argument, tentatively at first, RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 36-38 (1978), and
then more completely in his later Hard Cases article, id. at 105-23.
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The difference between a natural lawyer and a positivist does not
lie in how judges should be thoughtful about the source of their
obligations. Rather, the difference lies in seeing such ideals as the
rule of law, democracy, and the separation of powers, as part of the
standards that obligates judges in their role as judges, or, by
contrast, as reasons not part of such standards even though they are
reasons for playing such a role to start with. Consider a work-week
metaphor: the positivist sees the judge while off the bench on
Sundays, sitting by Hume's reflective fireside musing about the role
of judging. The thoughtful judge sees that, as a person, she needs to
justify the coercive job she does on Monday through Friday, and that
the justification for continuing this job lies in ideals like democracy,
the separation of powers, and the rule of law. Yet on Monday
morning when she steps into role by putting on the judicial robes,
those ideals drop away as she does her job. The ideals justifying the
playing of the role, in other words, do not enter into how the role is
played. The baseball umpire (to adopt the simple-minded simile of
our new Chief Justice)"° may have to use morality to justify being an
umpire at all, but once that is done and he is behind the plate, the
values justifying his playing that role have no purchase on how to
call the balls coming over the plate.
This attempt to cabin the recourse to morality by judges-they
may use morality to justify the role but not use morality in playing
the role so justified-sounds better than it is. I shall defer saying
why until we have before us all four ways in which morality enters
judicial reasoning."
3. Morality in Hard Cases
The third way is a very familiar one. It stems from the inevitable
indeterminacies of the obvious law. Jeremy Bentham proclaimed
that ideally we would draft a book of laws so comprehensive that
citizens need but open the book to know the legal consequences

10. ConfirmationHearingon the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice
of the United States: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005)
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee, Chief Justice of the United States).
11. See infra p. 1536.
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attached to any possible action by them. 2 Bentham projected a tenvolume treatise on the science of legislation that he wanted to write,
although he only completed the first of these volumes. But we all
know that even if he had completed all the ten volumes, and even
if he had written the code such volumes would have outlined, his
ambition would have been hopelessly frustrated. "Fact is richer than
diction," J.L. Austin once opined. 3 The diversity of cases that
inevitably arise outstrips the vocabulary and the imagination of any
law-giver, no matter how talented.
Such indeterminacies make for what Lon Fuller called a "hard
case."'14 They are usefully grouped into four kinds. 5 One are true
cases of first impression, cases where there is no obvious law having
any bearing on how such cases should be decided. Whether a spleen
with unusual DNA (worth three billion dollars) can be property,"
whether surrogate motherhood contracts are valid, 7 and the like,
are arguably such kinds of cases. In such cases we have run out of
obvious law.
A second kind of hard case also involves a lack of determinate
precedent, but here the lack is not total. In the class of cases here
considered, there is a precedent case "in the neighborhood," but the
case up for decision is not on all fours with the precedent case. The
indeterminacy here is rooted in the indeterminacy of specifying the
holding of precedent cases. There is indeterminacy in specifying
such holdings for two reasons: first, there is no canonical text for
case holdings (as there are for statutes and constitutional texts);
and second, when subsequent judges thus necessarily make their
own generalizations about the rule of law for which a precedent case
stands, they face an indefinitely large number of possible generalizations that cannot be ruled out by the obvious law. Judges thus
12. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 343 (1945).

13. J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses: The PresidentialAddress, in 57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1, 21 (1956).

14. Fuller, Fidelity,supra note 1, at 601-69. 1 have eschewed Dworkin's derivative notion
of a hard case because he conflates truly indeterminate cases with cases that are determinate
enough under obvious legal materials but are morally absurd.
15. Joel Feinberg divided hard cases along somewhat similar lines. See Joel Feinberg, The
Dilemmas of Judges Who Must Interpret "ImmoralLaws," in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 91 (Joel
Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed. 1995).
16. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
17. In re Baby "M," 525 A.2d 1128, 1157 (N.J. 1987).
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have considerable leeway to distinguish a precedent case rather
than follow it, a power unchecked by the content of obvious law.
In such cases, what would we have a judge do? Should he flip
coins? Have trial by combat? See whether the parties or their
witnesses float when weighted down and immersed in a pond?
Surely recourse to morality to decide such cases is not just preferable but obligatory on judges, as against recourse to arbitrary
decision procedures such as these. In such a way morality enters
into judicial decision making (again, leaving aside whether, apart
from my stipulation, one wants to call the morality so used, 'law").
Too much law can be as bad as too little law in creating indeterminacy. A third kind of indeterminacy arises when the obvious law
contains two or more legal standards that apply to a given case, yet
these standards require that incompatible legal remedies be given.
If there is no priority rule between such standards, then the obvious
law is without resources to decide this kind of a case either. As with
cases of first impression, here too judges must use morality to
render judgment.
Fourthly, even when the obvious law contains a legal standard
that is both relevant to the decision of some case and not in conflict
with some other, equally relevant legal standard, the obvious law
may yet be indeterminate. I refer to the well known vagaries in the
meanings of terms used in legal standards. Framed as such
standards are in natural languages such as English, they are heir
to the vagueness, ambiguity, metaphor, and open texture which
infect all such natural language. This is such well trod ground that
surely it needs no further elaboration." Nor does the implication for
judicial decision making: here too judges must make moral judgments in order to pass legal judgment.
4. Moral "Safety Valves" and the Overrulingof Obvious Law
The fourth way in which morality enters the law is the most
interesting, both intrinsically and because it is the most controversial. I shall call this the "safety valve" route for infusing law with
morality.'9 Consider cases in which there is only one relevant legal
18. See Moore, Semantics, supra note 5, at 181-202.
19. See Moore, NaturalLaw Theory, supra note 5, at 354, 383-88; Moore, Semantics, supra
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standard, thus presenting no problem stemming from a conflict of
legal standards within the obvious law; further, that standard
incorporates no moral evaluations in its terms; and further, those
terms are not vague, ambiguous, or in any other way indeterminate
in their normal semantic application to such cases. The legal
judgment in such obvious applications of such non-conflicting,
relevant, clear legal standards thus need involve no moral judgments by judges (holding in abeyance the second point above, the
moral judgments needed to justify the obligatory force for judges of
such obvious legal standards).
Yet in some of such cases the obvious law cries out to be saved
from itself. In some of such cases the obvious application of the
obvious law will be obviously wrong-unjust, otherwise immoral,
contrary to what any law maker could have wanted, contrary to a
rule's purpose, or just plain stupid or absurd. Examples: the obvious
law without exception requires that the gates of the city should be
closed in time of war--does that forbid the opening of the gates
when the city's own defenders seek entry to escape their enemies? °
The obvious law prohibits vehicles from being in the city park-does
that forbid a veteran's group from placing a fully operational truck
on a pedestal as a war memorial?21 The obvious law prohibits
sleeping in the train station--does that require the conviction of the
ticketed passenger who nods off while waiting for his afternoon
train?2 2 The acquittal of the homeless person who has spread out his
belongings for the night but is not yet asleep?" The obvious law by
its terms forbids the taking of protected species such as certain
turtles-does that forbid a fisherman from taking a wounded turtle
to the center for marine mammals for treatment?2 4
By the natural grammar of English, a criminal statute requires
one who transports a visual depiction of sexual activity by minors
note 5, at 277-81.
20. See the hypothetical of Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, First Part, Part II, Q.
96, Sixth Article, in THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICs 67-69 (William P.
Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 2d ed.
2002).
21. See Fuller, Fidelity, supra note 1, at 663.
22. See id. at 664.
23. See id.
24. In re Lazara Herrera, 40. O.R.W. 93 (Dept. of Commerce Feb. 13, 1985).
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only to know that it is a visual depiction that he is transporting, not
that it is a depiction of sexual activity or that minors are depicted--does that require the conviction of a bookstore owner who
reasonably enough had no idea that some of the books he transported to his store were sexually explicit or involved minors?2" A
federal criminal statute forbids the obstructing or retarding of the
passage of the U.S. mail-does that require the punishment of a
state sheriff who arrests a murderer on probable cause if that arrest
takes place while that murderer was carrying the U.S. mail?26 The
state statute law gives property to whomever is named in a valid
will-does that require that the legatee named in such a will receive
the property devised to him if he murders the testator in order to
get it?2 7 By proclamation the king forbids commoners from addressing the king unless he first addresses them-does that forbid
commoners from warning a silent king that a coach is about to run
him over?2 8 Seventy-odd years of common law precedent bar suits in
torts against manufacturers by those injured by negligently
manufactured products, unless those consumers bought directly
from (are in "privity of contract" with) those manufacturers--does
this bar the suit by such injured consumers when the patterns of
distribution (for the product that injures them) have changed to the
point that the only persons likely injured by such defective products
are such consumers?29 Fifty-odd years of constitutional precedent
make clear that public facilities may be segregated by race so long
as they are equal in function-does that permit segregated schools
in Topeka in 1954?' The U.S. Constitution plainly requires each
state to have a republican form of government-does that obligate
U.S. judges to review the form of state governments to see if they
pass muster here?3
25. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). I discuss the case at
length in Michael S. Moore, PlainMeaning and Linguistics-A Case Study, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
1253 (1995).
26. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1868).
27. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).
28. As depicted in the cartoon The Wizard of Id, B. Parker and J. Hart (Dec. 17, 1967) (on
file with author). In the cartoon, after the king is run over by the coach he moans, "What
happened?" Now the literalist commoners can speak; they shout, "Look out!"
29. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. This is a classic example of a "nonjusticiable" controversy that nonetheless clearly
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In these and many other cases there is a strong cadre of legal
theorists who urge judges to save the obvious law from itself. Judges
are urged to overrule outdated or badly reasoned precedents, and
overrule the plain meaning of statutory or constitutional language.
Aquinas talks of overruling the letter of a statute with its spirit,3 2
Fuller, of using the purpose of a statute and not its ordinary English
semantics,3 3 Dworkin, of prioritizing a principle over a rule,34 and
Cardozo, of saving the common law from rigidity in the face of
changes in what Holmes called "the felt necessities of the times."' 5
These all come to much the same thing: a judge should use morality
to declare the obvious law not to be what obligates either him or the
citizens he judges, in cases where the obvious law leads to such
absurd results.
There is of course a dissenting view here. St. Augustine urged
judges to stay with the letter in such cases-otherwise, Augustine
argued, they arrogate to themselves the power of the law giver.3 6
Similarly, judges in our own times have urged their fellow judges to
stick with the obvious law, no matter how absurd its applications.
Warren Burger famously declared that it was not the job of a judge
to prevent the Endangered Species Act from rendering useless a one
hundred million dollar dam; 37 Frank Easterbrook has said he would
send the state sheriff to jail for obstructing the mail in the case
earlier referenced;3 8 if he could have gotten the votes, Nino Scalia
would have sent the innocent book dealer to jail in the child
pornography case in order to follow the grammar of the poorly
drafted statute.3 9
It is easy enough to see what drives such dissenting views. A
large part of the motivation here is what I call the conservative
arises under the text of the U.S. Constitution. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118 (1912).
32. See Aquinas, supra note 20.
33. See Fuller, Fidelity, supra note 1, at 663.
34. See DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 14-130.
35. See BENJAMIN N. CARDozo, THE NATURE OFTHE JUDICIAL PROCESS, Lecture 111 (1921).
36. Augustine is so quoted in AQUINAS, supra note 20.
37. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
38. Frank Easterbrook, Statement at the Federal Judicial Center's National Seminar for
Judges of the Courts of Appeals (1995) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statement].
39. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 80 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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temperament. This is the temperament that prefers a clear line to
a fuzzy line, even when the clear line is clearly drawn in the wrong
place. Another motivation, confined to statutory interpretation, is
that explicitly stated by Frank Easterbrook: "Sometimes the best
way to change a statute is to enforce it by its terms."4 ° Nino Scalia's
chastisement of poor legislative draftsmanship belies a similar
motivation. On the Easterbrook/Scalia view, if legislators know that
judges conceive of their job as simply following the obvious law no
matter where it leads, then it will force those legislators to do their
job more conscientiously. Thirdly, there is the respect due to the
ideals of democratic self-governance and the separation of powers.
In this view, it is only the words of the legislature that have the
imprimatur of democratic promulgation. Judges therefore must
treat all such words with equal respect, even when doing so is an
affront to common sense. Lastly, the rule of law virtues of having
law capable of generating reliable predictions of legal consequences
is said to argue for sticking with the obvious law-for that is what
will be obvious to citizens who care to look up the law.
Some of these considerations are plainly of greater merit than
others. (Scalia's arrogance vis-a-vis poor draftsmanship in the
legislature, for example, is as naive as Bentham in its assumption
that codes could eliminate such absurdities-as Aristotle saw long
ago, 4 ' such absurdities are inevitable in any system of general
rules.) Yet whatever their merit, surely the goodness of their
reinforcement in a particular case has to be balanced against the
substantive goodness achievable if the obvious law is put aside. And
equally surely, sometimes that balance must tip against the
conservative values behind the obvious law. State sheriffs should
not be punished for arresting murderous mail carriers, those
rescuing turtles should not be prosecuted for taking them, murderous legatees should not inherit from their victims, consumers should
be able to sue manufacturers in negligence when such consumers
are the parties foreseeably hurt by negligence in manufacture, etc.
This then is the fourth way in which morality enters judicial
reasoning-to put some play in the joints of an otherwise too rigid,
unchanging, and formalistic legal code. It is interesting how this
40. See Easterbrook, Statement, supra note 38.
41. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 21 (1958).

1536

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1523

fourth route for morality also shows why the second consideration
above also is a route by which morality necessarily enters law.
Recall the second set of considerations above, of the judge thoughtful of her obligations to apply the obvious law. What the "safety
valve" considerations show us is that the "obvious law" is not always
what obligates a judge; when the obvious law is too unjust, too
absurd, etc., the obligation of a judge is to "overrule" it, control its
'letter" by its "spirit," hold it "nonjusticable," etc. In which case,
notice that no matter how obvious the obvious law may be, it is
always a question for a judge whether the values justifying a
deferential judicial role outweigh, or are outweighed by, the values
disserved by absurd applications of the obvious law. Even if the
answer is obvious-that the obvious law should be followed-it does
not mean that the question was not asked.42
The omnipresence of the question of whether the obvious law
should be followed means that one cannot confine the values
justifying a limited judicial role to outside-of-role, "Sunday"
musings. Rather, such values enter into each application of the
obvious law by a judge, for each application requires a balance of
those values against the potential injustice of applying such obvious
law to the case before a judge. The values justifying a limited role
for judges thus, in this way, enter into the playing of that role by
judges. They cannot be sealed off in the way suggested earlier.
B. Morality in the Law
We now need to address the question suspended earlier, viz,
whether the morality judges ought to use in their reasonings as
judges should be seen as being part of the law. I suspended this
question because (as I have long thought) the practical question is
more interesting. How judges should reason has direct payoffs in the
real world in a way lacking in more theoretical questions.
But now suppose we all agree: judges should reason in the four
ways outlined earlier. Now we should ask the more theoretical
question: how should we conceptualize what judges ought to do as
judges? Are they in such cases following the law? If so, the law must
42. See Moore, Semantics, supra note 5, at 280-81.
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include the morality they are following. Or are they going against
the law in the name of something else, that is, morality (on this
view, misleadingly labeled, "the higher law")?
Legal positivists have a perfectly understandable way of conceptualizing what judges ought to be doing in my four kinds of cases.
About legal standards incorporating moral standards, they can
admit that judges should look to such incorporated moral standards,
but deny that the morality of such standards has anything to do
with their legality. On this view, it is the enactment of such
standards that alone confers legal status; their moral content is
irrelevant. In which case judges are concededly making moral
judgments in determining the content of such standards, yet such
moral reasoning is not part of distinctly legal reasoning-that is
confined to judicial determination of the facts of enactment and
judicial enforcement of such standards. In that sense, the morality
judges here should use need not be considered part of the law.
Likewise for cases where the obvious law is indeterminate: a
positivist could advise judges to look to morality because there is no
law in such cases. Because of this latter fact, such use of morality by
judges does not evidence some link of morality to law. When the
judge makes some law by his decision, the law that is made may be
morally correct, but it will still be law only because it was laid down
by the judge and not because it is morally correct. And, as for cases
where the obvious law cries out for correction, a positivist too can
urge judges to overrule precedent, overrule plain statutory meaning,
hold constitutional provisions nonjusticiable, etc.-only when the
judge does this, he is changingthe law. In which case, again the law
itself (both before and after it is changed) is free of any moral taint.
The natural lawyer's alternative way of conceptualizing these
judicial obligations, of course, is to deny both that the obvious law
is all the law there is, and that the "obvious law" is in fact always
law.
We thus face a conceptual choice that is not obvious. The
positivist keeps our notion of law simple-law consists of all and
only the obvious stuff; but the ethics of judicial obligation then
becomes complicated because judges (even in their role as judges)
are not always obligated to follow the law, nor are judges limited in
their judicial obligations to the law alone. The natural lawyer keeps
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our ethics simple: judges are always obligated (in their role as
judges) to follow the law and nothing but the law; but the notion of
law now becomes complicated, because the law is not only, and not
always, what we take to be obviously law.
I have always plumped for the latter, natural law conceptualization.43 Among other things, it alone can accommodate the intuitive
thought that the judicial role is defined by a judge's obligation to
follow the law. In addition, it is the only view that can make sense
of the idea that there are singular propositions of law, decisive of
cases, which are true before the judge deciding those cases makes
them true by his decision. But I do not intend to rehearse these and
other well-worn arguments here.
II. HOW DOES MORALITY RELATE TO THE LAW WE OUGHT To
HAVE?
I move now from the relation of morality to the law that binds
judges, to the relation of morality to the content of what ought to be
law in a liberal, democratic state. I move, thus, from the judicial role
to the legislative role. Legislators, no less than judges, need a theory
of their role, a theory about what are and are not proper ends to be
sought via legislation. 4 These ends are not themselves necessarily
law-for they are to guide the making of law, not to be that law
already.
A simple theory of the legislative role would be a representational
theory.4 5 On this theory, a legislator should simply represent
accurately the views of his or her constituents, whatever those views
might be. This is a proceduralist theory because it admits of no
substantive ends that guide or limit legislation. Such proceduralist
(or majoritarian) theory seems to be what J.F. Stephen had in
mind when he urged against Mill that in a democracy there could
be no principled limits to legislation, such as Mill's harm principle purported to be.4 6 Stephen's is one conception of the role of a
43. See sources cited, supra note 5.
44. On the theory of legislative aims, see MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 639-65 (1997).
45. See id. at 640-42.
46. See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1873).
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legislator in a democracy, but it is not the only one. The right of the
majority to rule, the hallmark of a democracy, need not be realized
on a daily, issue-by-issue reflection of majority will. Teddy Roosevelt, as one famous contrary example, viewed elective office as the
famous "bully pulpit" from which one led the electorate. If they did
not like the direction of the leadership, they regularly had the
opportunity to throw it out-that would be democracy at work. But
unless and until they do, legislators should legislate by their own
best lights. That requires some substantive theory of proper
legislative ends.
My sympathies have long been with the "bully pulpit" view of
democracy.47 (Not only is it better, but it also allows for a more
interesting discussion.) Where do we find a theory of proper
legislative ends? The obvious answer, of course, is "morality." Where
else would they be? Analogize the legislator to a judge deciding
those hard cases where there is no obvious law on the subject. I
earlier opined that recourse to morality by judges in such cases was
surely to be preferred to flipping coins, or to some other arbitrary
decision procedure.4" Mutatis mutandis for legislators. As John
Austin said, in contrasting legislators with judges, "all human laws
ought to conform to the Divine laws.... [H]uman lawgivers are
themselves obliged by the Divine laws to fashion the laws which
they impose by that ultimate standard. 49
It is remarkable that a century and a half of liberal political
theory has called into question Austin's crisp conclusion. Bentham's
other famous mentee, John Stuart Mill, was the original culprit
here. For Mill thought that one of the aims forbidden to legislators
in a liberal democracy was the aim of legislating morality. Only
legislation aimed at preventing behavior harmful to others was
proper; legislation aimed at promoting morality was as much
condemned by Mill as was paternalistically motivated legislation. 0
Mill has been succeeded by generations of liberal theorists
attempting alternative ways of condemning what is often called
47.
48.
49.
50.
(1859).

MOORE, supra note 44, at 640-42.
See supra p. 1531.
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184-85 (1954).
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 3-19 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1956)
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"morals legislation." For example: the state should not coerce or
encourage any moral conception of the good life; the state should at
least be neutral between competing conceptions of the good life; the
state should refrain from legislation on moral matters where there
is no overlapping consensus; the state should only provide the fair
framework in which differing moral visions can compete; etc.5 '
The critique of Mill and these post-Millian liberalisms is very
simple. If something is morally good (right, just, etc.), that gives
each of us a reason to promote its attainment. That is as true of
legislators as of anyone else: if laws can be made that promote
justice, there is good reason to make such laws. There are of course
many qualifications to this simple starting point. Uncertainty about
what is just may stay the legislative hand; as may doubts as to the
efficacy of legal sanctions to bring about certain morally good
things, such as virtue; as may the inevitable costs of using the
clumsy instrument that is the law; as may the respect due to groups
that autonomously make suboptimal moral choices.5 2 Even so
qualified, Austin's simple point is secure: the world is better if it is
morally better, and to the extent legislators can achieve that moral
betterment through law, they should do so.
Such "legal moralist" legislators can be as liberal as one pleases
in the legislation they propose. How liberal they are depends in part
on the strength of the various qualifications mentioned earlier. It
also depends on the structure of the morality they would enact into
law. If that morality contains such items as a general right to
liberty, then a moralist legislator should respect that part of
morality too. And if (as I think is plausible) such right to liberty
does not end where our obligations begin-if we have a right to do
wrong in some cases-then the legislative hand may be stayed
considerably, on issues like assisted suicide, euthanasia, abortion,
sexual preference, etc.53
The third thing making legal moralist legislators liberal is the
content of first order moral norms themselves. If you believe as I
51. Some of these latter day liberalisms are explored in JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF
FREEDOM (1986).

52. See MOORE, supranote 44, at 661-65.
53. See id. at 739-95; see also Michael S. Moore, Freedom, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 9
(2005).
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do-that the morality of both virtue and of obligation is simply
silent on sexual matters, such as what organ one puts into what
orifice of what gender of what species-then it requires no recourse
to a right to liberty to stay the legislative hand on laws regulating
sexual behavior. This is where liberals should pitch their battle
lines. They should not be arguing that it is wrong to legislate
morality; rather, their honest argument is that in areas like sexual
behaviors, it is the wrong morality that has been legislated.
Surely this was the motivating kernel of Mill's brand of liberalism. What Mill's harm principle really is is not a limit on proper
legislative aim; it is a theory of when behavior is morally wrong.
Most harming of others without their consent is morally wrong, and
most seriously immoral wrongs consist of causing such harms. In
which case, unconsented-to-harm-causing is a good, if rough, proxy
for the kind of serious moral wrongdoing that is the proper target of
legislation.
Austin thus had it right: of course we should be legislating
morality. The law we ought to have should be as near to morally
correct as we can make it.
III. SHOULD REAL OR CONVENTIONAL MORALITY BE PART OF THE

LAW?
I come now to morality itself. There are two issues I wish to
examine here. The first is a meta-ethical issue: is the morality that
is and ought to be a part of the law real or conventional morality? Is
it, in other words, the moral beliefs shared by citizens, the mores of
our society? Or is it what some call "critical morality," and what I
call real (or the correct) morality, the subject of our committed,
first person beliefs?' The second issue is a substantively ethical
question, albeit at a rather abstract level: is that morality utilitarian? Or more broadly consequentialist in character, including
justice as something to be maximized? Or is it non-consequentialist,
categorically demanding of legal actors' conformity to its norms
54. The distinction between correct morality and conventional moral belief is the subject
of three long articles by me. See generally Michael Moore, Legal Reality: A Naturalist
Approach to Legal Ontology, 21 LAW & PHIL 619 (2002); Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982
Wis. L. REv. 1061; Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2424 (1992).
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"whatever the consequences?" I shall examine the first issue here
and the second in the succeeding section.
I assume without argument (here) that meta-ethical relativis'm is
false.55 For if it were true-if a moral proposition like "bullfighting
is wrong" meant or presupposed that most people believed bullfighting to be wrong-then there would be nothing to discuss here.
For necessarily, wherever the law included morality it would include
conventional moral beliefs.
The argument for use of conventional moral beliefs that interests
me proceeds not from necessity but from desirability. The idea is
that it is right-really right-to look to popular, generally accepted
moral beliefs when questions of morality arise in the law. That at
least is the shape of the conclusion. What would be the reason(s)?
A. Epistemic Deference
1. The Supposed Wisdom of the Many
People who argue in these directions often profess a kind of
humility. They profess to find moral questions really difficult; they
profess uncertainty both about answers, and about how to rationally
defend their answers, to moral questions; they even express doubt
about whether there are any answers here; and they wonder
whether they have the right to impose their answers on others. So
they profess to defer to majority belief on moral matters.
I want to separate such deference into two strands. One is
epistemic: the idea is that, in light of the doubts about one's own
judgment in moral matters, one should defer to others' beliefs
because of their greater likelihood of being true. This is a kind of
Burkean deference.5 6 Morality is just too hard for us, so we should
defer.
I often wonder whether anyone really believes this. Everyone
has quite a few firmly held moral beliefs. Is it likely that they can/
55. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Note, Relativistic Jurisprudence:Skepticism Founded on
Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1417 (1988), revised and reprinted in HEIDI M. HuRD, MORAL
COMBAT 27-62 (1999).
56. I explore such Burkean deference in Michael Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional
Tradition,19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY'263 (1996).
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should/will render those beliefs doubtful because many others
disagree with them? If truth in morality is really so hard to achieve,
why defer to others, who surely are as muddled as are you? Does the
number of muddled people likely decrease the muddle? Surely a
cacophony of muddle is more muddled, not less.
It is thus no surprise that those who profess to defer to majority
belief on epistemic grounds "defer" only in the most Pickwickian
sense of the word. Take Dworkin as a case in point. Does anyone
believe that Dworkin is merely cohering the presupposed moral
beliefs of the American legal system when he discovers, everywhere
and always, his own political philosophy in such beliefs?5 7 Or
consider Thurgood Marshall's use of what most people would believe
if "fully informed" about the death penalty in order to interpret the
Eighth Amendment 5 8 -did that differ at all from what Marshall
himself believed to be true? There is in fact no good epistemic
reason to defer to other people's moral beliefs, and the people who
pretend to, don't.
2. Conventions as Heuristics
There is a related epistemic argument for use of conventional
morality in law, but it is distinct and merits separate mention. This
is the idea that perhaps conventional morals are a good heuristic to
true morality. Perhaps the awesome questions of true morality are
too much for us-whether a particular murderer really deserves to
die, for example. So perhaps we do better to hide the awesomeness
of moral decision, and just pretend we are doing the less emotionally
charged task of discovering what most people do or would think
about the question.59 In which case, we use conventional morality,
not because it is more likely to be true than are our own views on
57. As an example, consider Dworkin's attempt to show that the pre-Civil War U.S.
Constitution, and the morality that best made sense of it, contained "a conception of
individual freedom antagonistic to slavery." This, despite the explicit compromises about
slavery in pre-Civil War America. Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave-catchers, TIMES
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1975, at 1437 (book review).
58. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Abraham Goldstein once opined that jurors might do better with vacuous tests of
responsibility so long as they purport to be factual, for that relieves jurors of the "trembling
hands" incident upon fully self-conscious judgments of moral responsibility. ABRAHAM
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 81-82 (1967).
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true morality, but because thinking about conventional morality
gets us to our own best views of what true morality requires.
Yet surely simple heuristics are generally to be preferred to
oblique ones. Usually the best way to hit a target is to aim at it.
This is particularly true of moral insight. Far from distracting our
cognitive abilities, our emotions need to be engaged for us to
maximize our cognitive abilities with respect to moral belief. It is
the dry, wooden sociology of others' beliefs that is the danger here,
not our passionate commitment to our own.6' Dry recitation of a
sociology of moral belief does not engage us, does not make us take
responsibility, does not make us think hard. We accept wooden
applications of moral shibboleths in a way we could not if we are
seeking directly what is morally required of us. Indirection (through
conventional moral belief) is a worse, not a better, heuristic to true
morality.
B. DemocraticDeference
Somewhat more plausible, perhaps, is deference based not on the
fact that conventional moral beliefs are correct, but on the fact that
they are conventional, that is, they are what most people think.
Such respect for majoritarian belief could be based on democratic
ideals-the majority's right to be wrong--or on what might be
called, 'Munich ideals," that is, social peace and harmony is worth
the price of living under incorrect moral beliefs.
1. In the Law We Ought To Have
Suppose these democratic and "peace-at-any-cost" ideals convinced one to use conventional morals whenever morality enters the
law. How would that play out? Take first the legislative use of
morality, to 'legislate morals" as is called for by a legal moralist
theory of legislation. Suppose the morals we are to legislate are
what most people believe is moral, not what we the legislators
ourselves think to be truly moral. Now Mill's arguments against
legal moralism come into their own.61 After all, if legal moralism
60. Moore, NaturalLaw Theory, supra note 5, at 392-93.
61. See MILL, supra note 50, at 91-113.
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urges that conventional morals be made the basis of legislation,
then it is in truth no different than J.F. Stephen's more direct
majoritarianism. This conventionalist legal moralism would mean
that there are no principled limits to what may be legislated by a
majority. Lord Devlin showed us this in his debate with Herbert
Hart in the 1960s. 2 Combine Devlin's conventionalism about morals
with his legal moralist theory of legislation and you end up with
nothing different than Stephen's simple majoritarianism of a
century before.
Seeing this makes it easy to see why Mill thought he should be
arguing against legal moralism as much as against legal paternalism. For example, Mill was outraged by the Americans' proposal to
launch an expedition into the Utah Territory to stamp out (what
most Americans believed to be) the immoral Mormon practice of
polygamy.63 Mill took this to be an example of legal moralism doing
its pernicious work. Yet what if Mill thought that polygamy was
deeply immoral, perhaps like female circumcision in certain African
tribes. Would not his outrage have been eliminated-because then,
the Americans would have been legislating true morality and not (a
largely incorrect) conventional morality about sex. Mill surely
thought (as do I) that polygamy was no big deal morally speaking,
and therefore that using the coercive force of the law to stamp it out
was unjustified. In which case, Mill's real target was the use of
conventional morals as the basis of legislation, not the use of morals
as such.
2. In the Law We Have
Now turn to morality in the law we have, the law that obligates
judges in their roles as judges. As we saw, there are four ways by
which morality enters into the law we have, and let us consider how
it looks if we plug conventional morality in at each of these four
points.
(1) The explicit incorporation of moral standards into legal
standards.Consider the constitutional case first. As noted earlier,
the U.S. Constitution explicitly requires moral judgments by judges
62. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
63. MILL, supra note 50, at 111-12.
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as they exercise "the great power" of judicial review. Despite the
rhetoric of many Supreme Court opinions-that judges should
look to "those canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking peoples,"64 "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society,"6 5 "principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"6 "the
most specific level at which a relevant tradition ... can be
identified," 7 etc.-using conventional morality in exercising the
power of judicial review makes no sense. For remember, what is
being reviewed is the product of consensus moral beliefs-a statute
enacted by a representative legislature. It makes little sense for a
court to use that same conventional morality to review an expression of it by a more representative body. As John Hart Ely asked
several decades ago, between the two institutions, a legislature and
a court, is there really any doubt as to which more likely reflects
conventional moral sentiment?6 8
This general point is reinforced by a point specific to the rightsprotecting clauses of the United States Constitution. Such rights
become important when their support does not command a majority
so that they will not win out in the political process. The idea that
there are such minority rights against majority views again
makes little sense if these rights are given conventional-that is,
majoritarian-interpretations. A right good against the majority
only when the majority agrees with it is not much of a right. 9
These arguments are unavailable when it is not constitutional
law that incorporates moral standards, but is common law or
statutory law, so let me turn to those. One argument common to all
three kinds of law is based in language use. On the theory of
meaning I have long thought correct, when we speak we ordinarily
refer to things whose nature guides our meaning.7 ° If I request that
64. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952).
65. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
66. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
67. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
68. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACYAND DISTRUST: ATHEORYOFJUDICIAL REVIEW 67 (1980).
69. See Moore, Natural Law Theory, supranote 5, at 395.
70. See id. at 291-301.
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you "prospect for gold," I expect you to bring me stuff that is really
gold; "fool's gold," or other stuff commonly thought to be gold, will
not be what is meant. The same is true of moral usages. If legislatures direct judges to find wherein lies the best interest of a child,
or whether a petitioner for citizenship does or does not possess good
moral character, they like all other speakers should be construed to
mean what is really best or good, not what most people think is best
or good.7
It is possible of course, for prior judges, legislatures, or constitutional conventions to mean something else. It is possible they meant
for judges to look to popular moral beliefs. It is even possible they
meant for judges to look to their (the law-givers') moral beliefs on
these matters, whether such beliefs were conventionally accepted or
not. But absent some special context making the existence of these
special interpretive intents plausible, surely law givers should be
seen like other language users. Judges are to ascertain where the
child will really be better off, not guess at what most people would
think on the matter.
(2) The justification of the obvious law by the thoughtfuljudge. As
we have seen, the thoughtful judge justifies her use of obvious law
like statutes by political ideals such as democracy and the rule of
the law. It is this exercise that justifies judges in using the coercive
power of the state to order the litigants before them to give up their
property, their liberty, their children, and their lives. It is inconceivable to me that judges could (or should) ever feel satisfied in this
justificatory task, if they repaired only to conventionally accepted
versions of democracy, the rule of law, etc. For notice how personal
is this question: 'What justifies me in doing what I am about to do?"
That others think it fine cannot answer for me. 'Do I think it's fine?"
is the relevant question, and for that question only ideals which I
accept as true can fit the bill.
(3) Fillingin the indeterminaciesin the law in hardcases. In cases
of conflicting legal standards, cases of first impression, and cases of
penumbral application of legal standards-Fuller's and Feinberg's
"hard cases"-conventional morals have perhaps their most
plausible use. For if one thinks of these cases in the familiar similes
71. See id. at 320-38.
72. See supra notes 14-15.
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of Cardozo7 3-as "molecular" or "interstitial" legislation-then the
judge faces the same choice as any other legislator. Namely, the
choice between two conceptions of democratic legislation earlier
described: should he reflect popular opinion or lead it with his own
principled views? The fact that these 'legislators"-that is, judges
in hard cases-are not subject to the discipline of frequent, regular
election might incline one away from the "bully pulpit" conception
for which I earlier argued.
As many legal philosophers subsequent to Cardozo have noted,74
the "little legislator" view of judges in hard cases does not reflect the
continuity judges rightly sense between what they do in hard cases
and what they do in easier ones. On the "molecular legislation"
view, judges do two quite different things: in easy cases they apply
the law, and in hard cases they resolve disputes without aid of law
(while they are making new law to govern future disputes). Both
sides of this description seem inadequate. In easy cases, judgment
is required about whether a semantically easy case is a morally easy
case too, or whether the safety valve questions we discussed earlier
do not need to be brought into play. In hard cases there is an
extension (elaboration, interpretation) of what went before, not the
fresh beginning suggested by the phrases "dispute-resolution" and
"judicial legislation." Judges owe an obligation to extend the past in
a way arbitrators and legislators do not.
Agreeing with this familiar critique of Cardozo does not establish
that conventional morality should not be used in doing the interpretation required in hard cases. But it does open up this question: how
are we to conceive of "the past" to which judges owe fidelity in hard
cases? Should we see the obvious law that is to be extended in hard
cases as (1) a reflection of the community's moral beliefs, (2) an
imposition of the law givers' moral beliefs at the time that law was
laid down, or (3) a reflection of some underlying ideal of justice,
partially and somewhat inaccurately expressed by the obvious law?
If it is the first, then judges might well seek to extend that past
consensus by bringing it up to date with the present consensus. If
it is the second, then judges might well seek to extend that past
73. CARDOZO, supra note 35, at 113-14.
74. Prominently including Fuller, Fidelity, supra note 1, at 667-68; DWORKIN, supra note
9, at 14-130.
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imposition in light of those law givers' own views of what they did.
If it is the third, then judges should seek to extend that attempt to
capture justice with their own best insights as to what justice
requires.
Which of these views to adopt should not be settled by history. It
should not matter much how law givers of the past viewed what
they were doing. The question for judges is a more straightforwardly
normative one: how should the law that obligates them best be seen,
as expression of (popular or superior) will, or as an expression of
justice? In my vicarious judging-that is, my seminars in jurisprudence for judges-I never have had any doubt as to the right answer
here. Judges should see law makers of the past as striving for
justice and should thus join them in the task of achieving it.
(4) Saving the formal law from itself by asking the safety valve
questions of justice. I can be brief here because the use of conventional morality to answer the safety valve questions discussed
earlier makes as little sense as it does for using such morality in
judicial review, and for similar reasons. Recall that safety valve
questions save the obvious law from being grotesquely absurd or
unjust. Nothing can save the obvious law from itself except true
judgments of where justice really lies.
To see this, imagine trying to construct some formal, factual test
for when safety valve questions should be asked. Warren Burger
once opined that judges should ask such questions about absurd
interpretations of statutes only when the legislature marks its
statutes as eligible for this kind of judicial rescue. 5 Yet that would
mean one is stuck with the absurdity whenever the legislature does
not sense its possibility enough to so mark its work-and that is
absurd. Likewise, using the social facts about what most people
think is absurd or unjust to bound the use of the safety valve
questions will also produce injustice and absurdity whenever
popular opinion gets it wrong. The asking of safety valve questions
by judges is of necessity a first person exercise in getting the
morality right, not the third person exercise of piling the potential
errors of conventional morality on top of the actual error contained
in a literal application of the obvious law.
75. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n.33 (1978).
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IV. THE CONTENT OF MORALITY APT FOR LAW
To say that judges and legislators should look to real morality as
they do their jobs is of course not to say much until we say what
kind of content such morality might have. We can narrow this
question considerably if we cease talking about law in general and
focus more specifically on the areas of law the subject of this
conference, viz, criminal law, torts, contracts, property, constitutional law. Our question then is, what is the content of that morality
that is part of these areas of law?
Even this might seem to be an unmanageably large question, but
in fact the possibilities here are not numerous. To see this, let me
taxonomize three possibilities, taken both from ethics generally, and
from the kinds of theories typically proposed for these areas of law.
My aim will be to show that, despite appearances, there are only
three kinds of moral theories plausibly part of each of these areas
of law.
A. Competing Theories of Ethics
It is plausible to divide ethics into aretaic and deontic theories,
dealing, respectively, with virtuous character, and right and wrong
actions (and the culpability with which these are done). Although
aretaic theorists tend to be a bit imperialistic, regarding deontic
judgments as elliptical expressions of underlying aretaic judgments,
my own view is here ecumenical. A complete ethic makes both kinds
of judgments, without one or the other being primary.7"
Despite this parity within ethics, I assume that it is deontic moral
judgments that are of primary relevance to the law. This rather
standard liberal view regards it as both undesirable and (largely)
impossible to coerce virtue through law. The law does pretty well if
it can induce its citizens to keep their moral obligations, to observe
the social minimum of living together. Virtue is largely beyond the
crude instrument of legal sanction.
76. See MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 52-56 (1993).
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Restricting ourselves, then, to deontic moral theories, it is customary to distinguish utilitarian or other consequentialist theories,
on the one hand, from deontological (or "non-consequentialist")
theories, on the other." The moral landscape is a little bit more
complicated than this dichotomy suggests. It is not that there is not
a significant difference between consequentialist and deontological
theories. There is, but there is also a significant distinction between
welfare-based consequentialisms and rights or other justice-based
consequentialisms. Thus, those who oppose utilitarianism to "justice
theories" may have either of these distinctions in mind.
To illustrate, suppose one is contrasting utilitarian and
retributivist theories of criminal law. One could be contrasting
crime prevention as a welfare good, with the guilty getting their just
deserts as a non-welfare good. The debate here would then be within
consequentialist moral theory: punishment would be justified by
its good consequences, the debate being as to which of these are
better consequences. Alternatively, one could be contrasting
justifying punishment institutions by their ability to produce
good consequences of any kind, on the one hand, with justifying
such punishment as an "agent-relative," or "categorical duty,"
irrespective of good consequences. In this latter debate, the
retributivist-consequentialist who forgoes punishing some guilty
persons in order to get even more guilty offenders punished is as
much the opponent of the deontologist as is the more familiar
utilitarian consequentialist.78
It is plausible to think that those who design the general shape
of legal institutions are necessarily consequentialist in their ethics.
For such system designers necessarily adopt an agent-neutral view;
such legal designers cannot justly regard their agency as the special
source of their ("agent-relative") obligations. This is in contrast to
actors within legal systems. Such institutions may require each
agent to regard her obligations as categorical, that is, not to be
traded off against others keeping or not keeping their like obligations. One might thus condemn intelligence agents for justifying
77. See generallyMOORE, supra note 44, at 680-705; see also Michael S. Moore, Patrolling
the Borders of ConsequentialistJustification,LAW & PHIL. (forthcoming 2007) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Moore, Patrollingthe Borders].
78. MOORE, supra note 44, at 155-59.
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their killing of one innocent by that killing's prevention of more
killings of innocents; one might likewise condemn those judges who
lighten the punishment of one guilty person in order to induce him
to turn state's witness, and thus to secure the conviction and
punishment of more guilty persons. But this would be at most a
kind of "government house" deontology, a "deontology" to be followed
by agents because the legal institution requiring their adherence to
it will produce the best consequences overall.
So at the level of justifying our general institutions of criminal,
tort, property, contract, and constitutional law, I take us all to be
consequentialists.7 9 The interesting divide is then not that between
consequentialism and deontology; the interesting divide is between
welfare-oriented consequentialisms (utilitarianism) and justiceoriented consequentialisms (like retributivism, corrective justice
theories, etc.).

79. For a life-long committed deontologist, this is a troublesome conclusion to reach after
all these years. Yet at the level of allocating scarce social resources, I think the concession is
inevitable. One way to see this is via a theistic thought experiment. Suppose there were a god,
and suppose she laid down the categorical obligations of morality to each of us. (This is
historically one of the arguments for God's existence. See Michael S. Moore, Good Without
God, in NATURAL LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 221, 241-46 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).)
Would it be plausible to suppose she too was bound by such categorical obligations? When
deciding, say, between allocating resources to prevent serious breaches of duty, as opposed
to punishing serious breaches already done, should she spend every last cent on achieving
retributive justice? Surely not, and the same for human legislators.
Since I have long rejected "two-level" (or "indirect" or "rule") consequentialisms, how do I
reconcile this consequentialism about institutions and resource allocation with a deontology
for individual actors (including many governmental actors like judges, policemen, attorneys,
etc.)? The answer lies in the shape of the deontological obligations themselves. In a sense, the
imagined god (and the legislative analogue) aresubject to deontological obligations-but most
of their choice sets are outside the scope of such obligations. The intending/knowing,
acting/omitting, doing/allowing, etc. distinctions all mark the boundaries of our categorical
obligations, on the most plausible version of deontology. See Moore, Patrollingthe Borders,
supra note 77. And the resource allocation decisions imagined above all fall on the knowingomitting-allowing side of the line, which places them outside of categorical obligation and thus
subject to a background consequentialism.
(This is probably not worked out enough to be seen as satisfactory, but Leo Katz said I had
to say something here.)
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B. Competing Ethical Ideals in Five Areas of Law
1. Criminal Law
Let me now leave the taxonomizing of moral theories in ethics for
the taxonomizing of justificatory theories typically given in our five
areas of law. Take criminal law first. It is standard fare in the
philosophy of punishment to lump incapacitation theories, general
and special deterrence theories, moral education theories (including
expressivism when it lapses into occasional clarity), social cohesion
theories, and prevention of private revenge theories, into one kind
of moral theory, a utilitarian theory.' These are largely, although
not exclusively, crime prevention theories, so that the negative
welfare caused by punishment is justified by the positive welfare
produced by prevention of future crime, including the crimes of
would-be vigilantes. The usual opponents of utilitarian theories of
punishment are retributivist theories, according to which criminal
punishment is justified by the inherent justice of giving offenders
the harsh treatment that they deserve. For retributivists, punishment is not an evil justified only by its production of greater good;
rather, punishment of deserving offenders is an intrinsic good in its
own right."s
For much of the twentieth century the standard educated view
was to tout a third theory of punishment, often going under the
name of the rehabilitative ideal. On this view, punishment is
replaced with treatment of offenders. The justification for such
treatment was not crime prevention-that is just a utilitarian
calculation that reform is cheaper than incapacitation in reducing
crime. Rather, it was the good of the offender that is served by the
expenditure of social resources for such treatment. Because
offenders rarely choose to undertake such treatment voluntarily, the
theory was necessarily paternalistic in its forcing of such treatment
on offenders. s2

80. For a longer version of lumping such theories together as utilitarian, see MICHAEL S.
MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 233-37 (1984).
81. Id. at 235-37.
82. Id. at 234-35.
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The rehabilitative ideal has come and gone in criminal law
theory.8 3 It is worth pausing to see why this is so. To begin with,
notice that the rehabilitative ideal never was, and never could be,
a theory of criminal law and of punishment. Rather, it is/was an
ideal recommending the replacement of criminal law and its
punishment institutions with something else-a treatment system
for the "social disease" known as crime. Secondly, but relatedly,
notice also that the rehabilitative ideal is but an offshoot of a much
more general kind of justice-not retributive, but distributive,
justice. It is a hallmark of distributive justice that its desert base is
not what someone has done, still less who they are (in terms of
character). Rather, the desert base for a distributive justice claim
(in its non-Rawlsian form where there is such a thing as preinstitutional desert) is simply (1) that one is a person and (2) that
one has less of some good than the equality of persons would
mandate. It should thus come as no surprise that this distributive
justice ideal does not justify, but rejects, a criminal law that (1)
triggers state concern by what one has done and not simply on one's
status as a person with less, and (2) gives suffering (rather than
benefit) to those who are often already less well off than their fellow
persons.&
We end up, then, with two sorts of theories of the criminal law.
One justifies the criminal law by its ability to enhance welfare; the
other, by its ability to realize one kind of justice, retributive justice.
In addition, in the spoiler role is a third theory, a theory not of the
criminal law but one urging abolition of the criminal law. This, too,
is a justice theory, but the kind of justice served is distributive
justice.
This pattern repeats itself for three of the other areas of law. In
all three areas, utilitarianism remains one of the two main contenders as a theory for each area of law. The economists have perhaps
made this a little more difficult to see, with their sometimes
insistence that they are not utilitarian (and thus not subject to
the well-charted worries about utilitarianism).5 Yet if one starts
83. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981).
84. See MOORE, supra note 80, at 104-52.
85. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1981) (seeking to
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with a classical utilitarian like Jeremy Bentham,' and adds (1) a
substitution of Mill's preference-satisfaction for Bentham's pleasure
as the form of welfare to be maximized;" (2) a substitution of
Pareto's ordinal comparisons of utility for Bentham's cardinal utility
comparisons;' and (3) a behaviorism in which stable trade points in
costless markets are taken to fix Pareto-optimal points, in lieu of
Bentham's phenomenological intensity measures; then one ends up
with a welfare economics that is a recognizable form of utilitarianism. I thus lump the economic theory of torts, contracts, and
property together as but a variant of the utilitarian theory of those
areas of law.
2. Torts
The justice theories of torts, contracts, and property are more
diverse. Take torts first. The standard triad of theories in torts are
often labeled "the economic theory," "the fault principle," and "the
compensation principle." The economic theory of torts now comes in
many variations. From 1920 to 1960 Pigouvian welfare economics
held that goods and activities had to reflect their "true costs" in
order to achieve efficient resource allocation, and that any harmful
consequence of an activity was such a true cost.89 These ideas lead
to the recommendation of strict liability for such activities, as the
means for them to "internalize" such costs. Coase destroyed this
idea with the point that, in costless markets, harms caused to others
were always a cost of the activity causing them because of the
foregone opportunity of the harm-causer to extract a payment from

distinguish wealth maximization from utilitarianism).
86. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (Hofner Press 1948) (1789).
87. See generally J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998)
(1861).

88. The "ordinal revolution" began in Pareto. See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann. S. Schwier & Alfred N. Page eds., Ann. S. Schwer trans.,

Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1927); see also Robert D. Cooter, The Best Right Laws:
Value Foundationsof the EconomicAnalysis of Law, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817 (1989).
89. See generally ARTHUR CECIL PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). For a late

expression of Pigouvian welfare economics applied to tort law, see Guido Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
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the harm sufferers not to engage in the activity causing the harm.9
Post-Coasean theories have treated tort liability rules as either:
prods to efficient market behavior by those best positioned to engage
in it; entitlement rules of maximal clarity to allow efficient market
behavior; or rough guesses as to where a market would come out if
the transaction costs were not so high." These recommended rules
are much more interestingly diverse than Pigou's univocal recommendation of strict liability for causing harm.
All of these are recognizable versions of utilitarianism, for all
seek to enhance the net welfare of society by the appropriate placement of tort liability. What of the other two kinds of tort theories?
"Fault" is a misleading name for corrective justice theories. It is a
misleading label, because there are recognizably corrective justice
theories of torts which do not use fault as the trigger for liability,
but use causation without fault, or unjust enrichment without fault,
as their triggering rationales.9 2 Corrective justice is a better label
than fault, for it captures the salient features of this kind of justiceoriented theory of torts.
If I come into your house and deliberately smash your rare Ming
vase for no good reason, I have violated a primary moral duty I have
not to damage your property. It is plausible to think that by
breaching this primary duty I have created a secondary duty for
myself, namely, to correct as best I can this breach. I have in other
words, a moral duty to correct the injustice that I have caused. The
corrective justice theory of torts holds that a kind of justice is
realized if I do such corrections and that the purpose of liability
rules is to force me to do so.9
Notice how different the corrective justice theory is from the
utilitarian theory. In utilitarian theories, tort law is used to induce
efficient behavior that makes us all better off. Compensating the
harm-sufferer is good only instrumentally to something that is good
90. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
91. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACcIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 135-73 (1970).
92. An example of each is provided by the early theories of Richard Epstein, Jules
Coleman, and George Fletcher. See Jules Coleman, Corrective Justiceand Wrongful Gain, 11
J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (1982); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
151 (1973); George Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV. 537 (1972).
93. See Coleman, Epstein, and Fletcher, supra note 92.
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intrinsically, namely, the enhancement of social welfare.9 4 Whereas
in corrective justice it is intrinsically good that the harm-causer
compensate the harm-sufferer. It may be that this good actually
retards welfare, but that is by-the-by in a corrective justice theory.
Notice also that corrective justice differs from retributive justice.
For one thing, the triggers for legal liability differ because the
desert base differs. If one tries to harm another, or knowingly risks
harming another, without that other knowing of it, such attempting
or risking is a plausible basis for moral blame and retributive
punishment.95 But it is not a plausible basis for requiring corrective
justice, because without successful wrongdoing there is nothing to
correct. More importantly, the secondary duties are different
between the two kinds ofjustice. Corrective justice requires culpable
wrongdoers to make their victims whole to the extent they can; the
secondary duty is focused on the victim's injured state.9 6 Retributive
justice, by contrast, focuses on the offender's state; his duty is to
suffer a set back to his interests.97 While we can imagine cases
where the very same post-injury action by the wrongdoer both
compensates the victim adequately and punishes the wrongdoer
appropriately, there is no necessary correlation between these two
states of affairs. Often, "making amends" by compensation is not
enough punishment (as where there is no harm); sometimes making
such amends is more than the punishment one deserves (as in cases
of extensive harm).
Corrective justice also differs from distributive justice. One can
imagine what a distributive justice claim would look like for the
smashed Ming vase mentioned above: if everyone in society has one
but you do not, then you deserve one too on distributive justice
grounds.98 It does not matter for these purposes how you lost your
vase, or whether you ever had one; you do not have what everyone
else has and you are entitled to equal resources as a person, on
distributive justice grounds. So everyone else should kick in a little
bit, via the tax system, to buy you one.
94. See MOORE, supra note 44, at 107.
95. Although for those of us who believe in moral luck, the blame and the punishment are
less for attempting or risking, than for causing unjustified harm. See id. at 191-247.
96. See Coleman, Epstein and Fletcher, supra note 92.
97. See MOORE, supra note 44, at 104-10.
98. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Notice three differences with the corrective justice claim for
the vase. One is the desert base: being a person with less is enough
for a distributive justice claim, whereas for a corrective justice
claim that pattern of distribution is irrelevant. 9 What grounds the
corrective justice claim is your ownership of the vase and my
culpable wrongdoing in smashing it. Second, the weakness of the
distributive justice claim for the Ming vase reveals a limitation on
such claims not present in a corrective justice claim. Ming vases are
not very high on the list of human needs, so that an unequal
distribution of them presents a less pressing case of distributive
injustice than an unequal distribution of food, shelter, education,
health services, and the like. Whereas corrective justice is blind to
these differences: if the vase was yours, you have a corrective justice
claim to have it or its value returned to you irrespective of its trivial
effect on your basic needs.
Thirdly, corrective justice is inherently a two-party affair. I have
a duty to correct my unjust action. Someone else compensating you
does not satisfy my corrective justice duty. 10 Moreover, anyone else
who is dragooned into compensating you for your vase has a
complaint on corrective justice grounds, just as an innocent
wrongfully punished has a complaint on retributive justice grounds.
In each case, the one forced to compensate or to suffer does not
deserve it as a matter of corrective or retributive justice. For both
these reasons, anyone proposing a separation of the victim's right to
be compensated, from the wrongdoer's duty to compensate, has left
corrective justice for something else.' 01
This last discussion allows us to see clearly the true nature of the
third major kind of theory of torts, the one labeled "compensation."
This is in truth a distributive justice theory. It proceeds on the
assumption that no one should face alone the downside risks of
living together in society, that we all have a duty to redistribute
those harms from those on whom nature's lottery has placed them,
to all of us collectively. 0 2 It matters not how one was hurt, on this
99. See, e.g., Stephen R. Perry, On the Relationship Between Corrective and Distributive
Justice, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 237, 239-63 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000).
100. See Epstein, supra note 92.
101. Coleman early on seems to make this mistake. See id.
102. See generally RAWLS, supra note 98.
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distributive justice theory, but only that one was hurt when others
were not.
Just as the distributive justice basis of the rehabilitative ideal
disqualifies it as a theory of the criminal law, so the distributive
justice basis of the compensation ideal of torts disqualifies it as a
theory of tort law. The scheme of social insurance that this rationale
would justify is not a tort system at all, as Holmes recognized long
ago; it is an alternative to tort law.0' The New Zealand social
insurance scheme, and workmen's compensation and no-fault
automobile accident schemes in the United States, are usually seen
quite accurately in this light. 10 4
Torts thus repeats the pattern of criminal law. Two kinds of
theories compete as theories of torts, utilitarianism and a justice
theory, in this case corrective rather than retributive justice.
Distributive justice again plays the spoiler role, urging an alternative to the tort system, not a justification for the system we have.
3. DistributiveJustice in Contractsand Property
Property and contract reveal the same basic pattern, but with this
difference: for these areas of law, what distributive justice recommends is so removed from the shape of the doctrines in property and
contract that there is nothing like the rehabilitative ideal or the
compensation principle even parading itself as a theory of these
areas of law. Distributive justice is the flat out enemy of property
rights ("property is theft," and all that), as Bob Nozick sought to
show in detail.' 5 Distributive justice also has no truck with the
property-like rights conferred on the promisee of a contract. To
distributive justice, contract rights look like incipient property
rights and are equally antithetical to entitlements based on needs.

103. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 77-78 (Little, Brown & Co.
1923) (1881).
104. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr., The New ZealandAccident CompensationReform,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 781 (1981) (reviewing GEOFFREY PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY

(1979)).
105. Nozick was talking about what he called "patterned principles of distributive justice,"
which I take to be essential to distributive justice as such. See ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA 168 (1974).

1560

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1523

It is not that distributive justice does not have an impact on
property and contract doctrines. The revolution in landlord/tenant
law in America in the sixties and seventies, for example, was based
on distributive justice notions. As one of those revolutionaries, J.
Skelly Wright, confessed, he came to Washington, D.C. from Baton
Rouge and noticed two things about the residential rental market
in the District: the tenants were poor and black, and the landlords
were rich and white, and he vowed to do something about that. °6
Rent control ordinances and certain use restrictions (such as those
of the California Coastal Commission) are similarly motivated. 0 7 A
similar motivation appears behind substantive unconscionability
doctrines in contract law, as well as behind the imposition of nonwaivable, implied terms.
But these are isolated intrusions of distributive justice into
property and contract. These isolated intrusions do not add up to a
systemic replacement of property/contract regimes with some
alternative regime that would be close enough to what we have that
one might (mis)name it a theory of property, or a theory of contracts.
Perhaps this is because in our system of law the systematic impact
of distributive justice ideals on property and contract rights has by
happenstance been put elsewhere, in the progressive income tax.
But more important, I think, is the more blatantly hostile attitude
to property and contract within the distributive justice ideal itself.
4. The Promissory Theory of Contract
Apart from the diminished role of distributive justice in contract
and property, there is otherwise the same competition between
utilitarianism and justice theories as there is in criminal law and
torts. The only difference is that for property and contract, utilitarianism is more predominant than it is in criminal law or torts. The
reason for this begins with the fact that most justice theorists are
also what we might call background utilitarians. That is, if one's
justice theory imposes no obligations or permissions on some topic,
106. Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in ResidentialLandlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 549 (1984) (letter from Judge J. Skelly Wright to
Professor Edward Rabin).
107. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987).

2007]

FOUR REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND MORALITY

1561

then other things equal, it is good to enhance welfare, just as
utilitarianism suggests. Utilitarianism is in that sense always
there, in the background so to speak.' Utilitarianism thus comes
into the foreground when justice theories are implausible or weak.
Such is the case here, particularly with contracts.
One way to construct a justice-oriented theory of contracts is to
fold such a theory into the big tent of corrective justice. On this
view, contract law exists to force people to correct the injustice of
breaching their primary obligations to others, in the special case
where those primary obligations are based on a promise (rather
than existing generically between persons, as in tort). This view
analogizes breach of contract to torts. Take the closely related tort
of promissory fraud, in which the wrongdoer promises something
with no intention of delivering on the promise. In most states such
misrepresentation of intention is actionable as a tort. On the
corrective justice view of contract, breach of promise is just a
temporally segmented, but otherwise analogous, tort: the combination of two things done at different times-the making of the
promise (even with the intention to keep it) and the subsequent
breach-has unjustly caused the promisee harm, which the
promisor owes a duty of justice to correct.
A large problem with this corrective justice view of contracts is
that it does not square easily with the legal regime of AngloAmerican contract doctrine. I refer to the Anglo-American remedy
for breach, which is either a decree of specific performance or
damages measured by the net value of the promised performance to
the promisee. On a true corrective justice view, the wrongfully
breaching promisor should restore her promisee to the status quo
ante. This would justify reliance damages (including lost opportunities), but not specific performance or benefit-of-the-bargain damages. A fundamental feature of our contract law is that it forces
people to keep their promises (either literally or with the monetary
equivalent), whereas corrective justice would only require them to
restore the world to where it was before they wrongfully changed it
by promising-and-then-breaching.

108. See Moore, Patrollingthe Borders, supranote 77.
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Seeing this reveals the possibility of a justice-oriented theory of
contracts that is not a corrective justice theory. Indeed, what are
often called "promissory theories of contract," like Charles Fried's, 10 9
are typically not corrective justice theories. To understand such
theories, start with a traditional view within ethics about the
primary duty to keep one's promises. On the traditional view,
promising is the execution of a normative power: we create an
obligation by the act of promising."0 Moreover, unlike obligations
created by mere vows or requests of friends, this is a very strong
obligation. From Kant to Rawls,"' keeping one's promise is a
textbook example of strong, categorical obligation we each have.
Breaching a promise is thus, on this view, a big deal morally. If
legal moralism is correct with regard to criminal legislation, it is
then quite a puzzle why breach of promise is not criminalized. The
answer could be because contract law effectively prevents there from
being any breach. By its remedies, contract law ensures that
promises are kept-albeit later than they should be, and sometimes
only with the monetary equivalence of performance. But still, they
are kept. Surely, this view would contend, if we could do this for
other serious moral breaches, we would. Retributive justice may be
a true kind of justice, but it would be strange to think that a just
punishment of a serious moral breach is to be preferred to there
being no such breach to start with. Quite the reverse is true: if we
can prevent such breaches, that2 is better than after the fact
1
punishment, no matter how just.
The unfortunate fact is that we cannot prevent completed crimes
by judicial decrees. Death and personal injury have happened, and
like the proverbial broken egg, when it has happened there is no
going back to undo it. But with broken promises there is. Contract
law prevents anything other than temporary breaches, forestalling
the need for retributive punishment. One could thus call this
promissory theory, the preventative retributive theory of contracts.
109. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981).

110. See J. Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY 210, 210-28
(P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz, eds., 1977).
111. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS
70-71 (H.J. Paton ed. & trans., Harper & Row 3d ed.1964); John Rawls, Two Concepts of
Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
112. Thus, the resource allocation consequentialism mentioned earlier. See supra note 79.
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I sketch this justice-oriented theory in such detail not because I
believe it. On the contrary, the view is broken-backed from the
beginning: keeping one's promise is not plausibly a stringent moral
obligation.1 1 In my view, it is right down there (not up there) with
lying. But this is the kind of view that would justify the contract law
we have. Ergo, the weakness of any justice-oriented alternative to
utilitarianism as a viable theory of contracts.
5. NaturalRights Theories of Property
Justice-oriented theories of property are not quite in such bad
shape. There are two lead candidates here: the personality theory
as it has descended down to us from Hegel," 4 and the labor theory
of Locke" 5 and his descendants, modern Lockeans like Nozick" 6 and
(most of the time) Epstein. 1 7 Consider the personality theory first.
Putting aside Hegel's own rather vague but suggestive formulations,
18
and focusing on Peggy Radin's modern restatement of the view,1
the personality theory holds that we constitute ourselves as persons
through ownership of property. It is things that allow us to draw
self-boundaries as infants, it is ownership of things that (with their
permanence) serve as mnemonic devices connecting our past to our
future via our memory, it is ownership of things that expresses our
personality and character-structure, and it is ownership of things
that expands our physical selves beyond our bodies to our clothes,
our canes, our chairs, etc.
This is surely a weak justificatory scheme for property law. To
begin with, as Radin recognizes, it applies only to a tiny fraction of
what we think of as property; she labels as "personal property"
things like heirlooms, homes, clothes, and, in Southern California's
car culture, BMW's. She realizes that most property is "fungible"
property for which no such personality justification is plausible.1 9
113. See Heidi Hurd, Promises/Schmomises (forthcoming) (on file with author).
114. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 21-31 (1952).
115. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 25-31 (J.W. Gough ed.,
Barnes & Noble 1966) (1690).
116. See NOZICK, supra note 105, at 174-82.
117. Richard A. Epstein, Possessionas the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979).
118. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
119. See id. at 991-1013.
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Secondly, even within the narrow confines of personal property,
property rights, like promissory rights, are moral light-weights. The
English novelist, Morgan Forster, had a healthier view about
ownership of property. 2 ' About some woods he had purchased, he
mused that property holdings are encumbrances to our living well,
what with their shallow preoccupations which pretend to a significance that they do not possess.
The Lockean labor theory is better. In its limited domain Locke's
famous argument for why one is justified in the exclusive rights of
private property is still persuasive today. You remember: Locke
starts with the communist premise that God gave the world to
mankind in common;' 2 ' yet the exception was we each own our
bodies and therefore the labor of them.'2 2 When we mix our bodies
and their labor with external things, those too become ours,'2 3 so as
long as we leave "as much and as good" for others to do likewise.'2 4
Because of the equal opportunity of others to labor and also enrich
themselves,'2 5 if we do so and they do not it is just that we keep the
fruits of our labor (so long as we do not waste them), 2 6 and the nonlaboring, free-riding others do not share.
Confined to situations where the mixing is really a creating of
something new, and where the first proviso is truly satisfied, Locke
is pretty persuasive, is he not? If I write a novel, by natural right it
is my (intellectual) property, to do with pretty much as I please,
including, like Kafka, to destroy it. 127 But: (1) this does not go very
far, inasmuch as in an industrialized society, most kinds of property
are held by non-Lockean laborers who hold title derivatively
because of transfers by others; and (2) even in the paradigm cases
where something new is created out of abundant materials equally
available to all, there are cases like Nozick's medical researcher who
120. E.M. Forster, My Wood, in ABINGER HARVEST 22 (1936).
121. See LOCKE, supranote 115, § 26.
122. Id. §§ 27, 44.
123. Id.
124. Id. § 32.
125. Id. § 34.
126. Id. § 31.
127. Kafka ordered his literary executor, Max Brod, to burn his unpublished writings, as
Brod tells us in his postscript to one of the manuscripts he was supposed to burn. See Max
Brod, Postscriptto the FirstEdition of FRANZ KAFKA'S THE TRIAL, at 328 (Willa & Edwin Muir
trans., E.M. Butler ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1959) (1925).
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discovers a breakthrough cure for cancer all by himself.128 Surely
such cases present strong moral limits on the exclusivity distinctive
of property rights.
Property thus joins contract as lacking a generally persuasive
justice theory. Because the justice theories of property and contract
are as weak as they are, utilitarianism is a more dominant theory
here than it is for criminal law or torts.
6. ConstitutionalLaw
Constitutional law may seem to be the odd man out here, for
nothing in what is usually called a theory of constitutional law
seemingly tracks the tripartite division into which we can place
theories of tort, contract, property, and criminal law. There are to
be sure substantively moral theories of constitutional law that
discover the theorist's preferred value scheme in the text of the
United States Constitution, and some of those preferred value
schemes track the divisions we earlier encountered-there is the
libertarian constitution of Nozickian libertarians,12 9 there is the
egalitarian constitution of Rawslian egalitarians,"3 ° etc. Yet there
are also substantive theories of the United States Constitution that
do not track the tripartite division, such as David A.J. Richard's
theory that liberal tolerance is the dominant theme of the text,131 or

128. See NOZICK, supra note 105, at 181. Nozick's "medical researcher who synthesizes a
new substance that effectively treats a certain disease" became more than a philosophy
professor's hypothetical. In 1990, on the backside of Kilimanjaro at 15,000 feet a local porter
was afflicted with pulmonary edema; he could not be lowered because of darkness and cliffs
below. Two U.S. doctors possessed an experimental drug, non-FDA approved and unavailable
in the United States; the drug was developed to drain the lungs of someone afflicted with
pulmonary edema. The doctors, husband and wife, members of a fifteen-person climbing team,
had only two doses of the drug, which they had taken considerable trouble to obtain for their
own use should they become afflicted with pulmonary edema. (They were not doctors explicitly
assigned to be the team doctor, nor did the team doctor's medical kit include the experimental
drug.) Reciting that their labor and ingenuity had left "as much, and as good" for others, they
refused to give up the drug, even at the probable cost of the porter's life. The five lawyers who
were a part of the climbing team (including Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd) disagreed. My
sense was (and is) that they were obligated to give up the fruits of their labor, no matter how
satisfied might be Locke's argument for just acquisition of a property right in the drug.
129. See generally,e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
130. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 112-43 (2000).
131. See generally DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
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John Hart Ely's reading that democracy fundamentally animates
the document, 132 etc.
When constitutional theorists are not pressing such substantive
agendas-when they are, in their own terminology, "clause-bound"
theorists-what seems central to the practice of constitutional
theory, as American scholars practice it, are four questions: (1)
What is the text of the United States Constitution-the document,
Supreme Court precedent, contemporary public consciousness,
original understanding, etc.? (2) Why is such a text authoritative
for judges and citizens? (3) How is such a text to be interpreted?
And, building on the answers to the previous three questions, (4)
how can one justify the "great power" of judicial review according to
which the judges' view of the Constitution prevails over the view of
it held by a majority of citizens and by their elected representatives?
It seems every generation of American constitutional theorists
has to answer anew the challenge to democratic self-governance
presented by judicial review. The question, including the subquestions (1) to (3) above, is central to what we call constitutional
theory in America.
In this central question of the legitimacy of judicial review, one
can see some expression of the opposition we have seen before,
that between utilitarianism and justice theories. Democratically
selected legislation is likely welfare-enhancing (at least in a
preference-satisfaction sense of welfare), and a democratically
selected legislature is often pictured as essentially utilitarian in its
reasonings. By contrast, courts are often pictured as principled in
the sense that they focus on principles of justice in their constitutional interpretations. 133 This is particularly true for the rightsprotecting half of the courts' constitutional work, as opposed to the
division of powers umpiring, which is the other half. We often
conceptualize and justify judicial review as the courts' protection of
natural rights against the unjust use of individuals by the utilitar13
ian legislature. 1
132. See generally ELY, supra note 68.
133. Most famously, as in Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). See also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 469 (1981).
134. See Wechsler, supra note 133.
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This picture is of course overly simple on both sides of the
comparison. Legislatures, as Jeremy Waldron has of late been at
such pains to point out, are not necessarily and not always utilitarian in their reasonings or their results." 5 They too, like the courts,
can and do worry about treading on the natural rights of citizens.
And courts are not purely forums of principle, nor is constitutional
adjudication concerned exclusively with protection of rights or
justice more generally. Still, there is enough truth to the equation
of ordinary politics with utilitarianism, and to the equation of
"framework politics" (that is, constitutional law) with justice, that
some semblance of this opposition can be seen in constitutional law
too.
C. Picking the Best Moralityfor DiscreteAreas of Law
To say more about each of these five areas of law would be to
intrude upon the body of this conference itself. I take it that as we
go through each of these five areas of law a central concern is to
assess whether torts, say, is really about corrective justice, efficiency, compensation, or something else; whether each of the others
is really about utility, justice, equality, etc. Having taught all five
areas of law as first year courses many times, I do not lack views
here; but the conference participants are the ones to explore this in
detail, not me.
However, perhaps this introduction can be helpful in separating
some questions. We might separate out four kinds of questions we
could ask about each area of law and the moral ideals that are
arguably a part of it. The first is the purely descriptive, doctrinal
question: do the institutional details seem to realize one ideal
better than the other? This is a matter of extrapolating from legal
doctrines, the values they could sensibly serve, given those doctrines' contents.13 Second is a purely ethical question: are these
135. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 164-87 (1999). My own view is that
democratic legislators tend to be utilitarian in their reasonings, for reasons mentioned in
Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory, supra note 5. Chapter Eight of Waldron's book,
and my last cited article, arose out of a formal debate on this matter he and I engaged in at
the University of Pennsylvania in 1995.
136. This is what some judges, such as Felix Frankfurter, called finding the "intention in"
a legal doctrine (not to be confused with the actual intention held by any law maker). See
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different ideals truly valuable? Is utilitarianism, for example, so
crippled by its many well-charted difficulties in ethics that it could
not be a valid goal of law in these areas?13 7 Thirdly, and building on
the first two questions, there is the question of the unique good or
function served by each of these areas of law: can one identify what
each of these areas of law is uniquely good for, what might be its
purpose, in the sense of function?1 3 ' Are the kinds of justice, for
example, served one-to-one by a kind of law? Fourthly, there is a
causal, explanatory question: did belief in certain of these ideals
cause the formation of the doctrines we possess in each of these five
areas of law? Was it some half-conscious belief in economic efficiency, for example, that caused judges to decide negligence cases in
the way they did one hundred years ago?' 39
A "theory" of an area of law is often a blend of these descriptive,
evaluative, interpretive, and explanatory questions. Theorists like
myself would of course like it if their favored theories-say,
retributivism about criminal law-made maximal moral sense of the
doctrines we have, point to something of real value, show that value
to be uniquely served by this area of law, and showed how belief in
such value caused us to have the doctrines that we do. 140 But
theories can be valuable without such total victory. We should be
interested in hearing where theorists of the different areas of law
come out, even on a piecemeal basis.

Moore, Semantics, supra note 5, at 258-63.
137. For a good survey of problems, see ANTHONY QUINTON, UTILITARIAN ETHICS (1973).
138. I explore what it means to attribute functions to law in MICHAEL S. MOORE, Law as
a FunctionalKind, in NATURAL LAW THEORIES (R. George ed. 1992), reprintedin EDUCATING
ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 294-332 (2000). I explore what it
means to attribute functions to areas of law in MICHAEL MOORE, A Theory of CriminalLaw
Theories, in TEL AVIV STUDIES IN LEGAL THEORY (D. Fridmann, ed., 1990), reprinted in
MOORE, supra note 44, at 3-80. I explore what it means to attribute functions to particular
laws in Moore, Semantics, supranote 5, at 262-65.
139. Arguably Richard Posner's early thesis. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence,
1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
140. These are roughly the conclusions about retributivism and the criminal law of MOORE,
supranote 44.
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CONCLUSION

Suppose law had no connection to morality. Suppose, that is, that
Bentham wrote his ideal code and it was both complete and
consistent. 141 Suppose Stephen had his way over Mill,1 42 Devlin over
Hart, 14 so that the content of the law we ought to have is fully
determined by what a majority of citizens wants. Then to know the
law, as a judge, lawyer, citizen, or scholar, is to know history-the
history of institutional detail of a certain sort. Then to know what
ought to be made law as a legislator is to know the results of the
most accurate opinion surveys. Then to teach the (contract, torts,
etc.) law we have or ought to have, would be to teach these facts of
institutional and social history, period.
What a bore! It is morality in the law that makes law worthy of
our intelligence and our interest. It is the morality in the law that
makes the philosophy of law truly philosophical-and not the butt
of Clemenceau-like comparisons to military music. 144 I left public
international law as an undergraduate once I discovered its
obsession with the history of treaties; I left the practice of tax law
once I discovered. its immersion in the details of the legal labyrinth
known as the Internal Revenue Code, the Regulations, and the case
decisions. Imagine if all law were truly like that. I don't know about
you, but I would find something else to do.

141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra text accompanying note 11.
See supra text accompanying note 44.
See supra text accompanying note 62.
Roughly, military justice stands to real justice as military music stands to real music.

